Litigation

Litigation Risk in Fintech and Digital Contracts

How Nigerian in-house counsel should assess and manage disputes arising from electronic signatures, click-wrap agreements, and blockchain transactions — as Nigeria’s largest fintech sector in Africa collides with analogue legal infrastructure.

The Docket · Kempes & Kaplan LPLitigation Intelligence for In-House Counsel · Vol. 1, Issue 217 February 2026 13 min read

Last reviewed 17 February 2026

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The collision of digital commerce and analogue law

Nigeria’s fintech sector is now the largest in Africa by investment volume and among the fastest growing globally. Mobile lending platforms, digital payment gateways, BNPL services, blockchain-based remittance tools, and neobanks have collectively reshaped how commercial obligations are created, performed, and broken.

Yet Nigerian contract law — and the courts called upon to enforce it — developed in an era of wet-ink signatures and paper trails. The collision between digital commerce and analogue legal infrastructure is producing a new generation of disputes that in-house counsel must understand, anticipate, and actively manage. The sector has seen roughly 3.7x growth in fintech disputes between 2020 and 2024, ₦2.1 trillion in digital payment transaction value in 2024, and an estimated 68% of fintech contracts lacking adequate dispute clauses.

Digital contracts on a smartphone — fintech’s convenience multiplies its litigation surface.
Fig.Digital contracts on a smartphone — fintech’s convenience multiplies its litigation surface.
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Risk area 01 — Electronic signatures: validity and enforceability

The central question courts face in digital contract disputes is deceptively simple: was there a valid, binding agreement? In the fintech context, this question immediately raises the issue of whether an electronic signature — or a tick-box — constitutes a legally effective execution.

Nigeria’s primary instrument is the Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, etc.) Act 2015, which recognises electronic signatures, and the Evidence Act 2011, which admits electronic documents subject to authentication. The Electronic Transactions Bill, though still pending, signals legislative intent to broaden the framework. However, the current framework contains significant gaps that create litigation exposure: the authentication burden (Section 84 of the Evidence Act requires a party relying on computer-generated evidence to produce a certificate attesting to the proper functioning of the computer — many fintech companies fail to preserve this evidence, making their records vulnerable to challenge); the absence of a unified e-signature standard (unlike the EU’s eIDAS Regulation or the US E-SIGN Act, Nigeria has no single statute governing the equivalence of electronic and handwritten signatures, and courts have applied inconsistent standards); and sector-specific carve-outs (certain instruments — wills, deeds of conveyance, negotiable instruments — remain outside the electronic execution framework, so fintech products that stray into these categories, such as digital mortgages, face heightened execution risk).

In Registered Trustees of the Apostolic Church Nigeria v. Attorney-General of Ogun State, the Court of Appeal held that electronic communications could constitute binding correspondence but emphasised that authentication of authorship remained the claimant’s burden. The principle applies directly to fintech agreements — the platform must be able to prove who signed, when, and on what device. Practical exposure points: OTP-based consent (one-time passwords are widely used as signature proxies, but courts have not definitively ruled on whether OTP acceptance constitutes execution of a contract, and the position remains unsettled for high-value transactions); audit trail preservation (platforms that cannot produce timestamped logs of user consent, IP address, device ID, and session data are unlikely to survive a well-run authentication challenge); and biometric signatures (BVN-linked and facial recognition-based authentication is increasingly used but has not been litigated under Nigerian contract law — treat biometric consent as an emerging, untested risk).

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Risk area 02 — Click-wrap agreements: are your terms binding?

A click-wrap agreement presents terms to a user who must affirmatively click “I Agree” before proceeding. Browse-wrap agreements, by contrast, merely provide a hyperlink to terms and assume consent from continued use. Both are pervasive in Nigerian fintech — and both are litigation risks.

Nigerian courts have not yet developed a settled jurisprudence on click-wrap enforceability. In its absence, courts are likely to draw on English common law principles and analogous US and Singaporean decisions. The recurring issues: was the user given reasonable notice of the terms (terms buried three scrolls down a mobile screen — common in Nigerian apps — may not constitute adequate notice); did the user have a meaningful opportunity to review the terms (auto-scrolling consent screens timed at 3 seconds have been challenged in comparative jurisdictions); was consent freely given or coerced by the platform design (dark patterns — pre-ticked boxes, countdown timers, confusing layouts — expose platforms to unconscionability arguments); and were the terms sufficiently clear to be enforceable (arbitration clauses, liability caps, and data-sharing provisions buried in 47-page T&Cs face severability challenges).

The browse-wrap problem: browse-wrap agreements are materially more vulnerable. A user who has not been shown the terms, has not clicked to accept them, and may not know they exist has not, in any recognisable contractual sense, agreed to them. Several high-value Nigerian fintech disputes — particularly involving data monetisation — have turned on this exact issue. In-house counsel action: audit all consumer-facing agreements. Any agreement that relies on browse-wrap should be converted to click-wrap immediately. Any click-wrap that buries material terms — particularly arbitration, class action waivers, or data-sharing consents — should be restructured to bring those terms above the fold, in plain language, before the click.

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Risk area 03 — Blockchain transactions and smart contracts

Smart contracts — self-executing code deployed on a blockchain that automatically performs obligations when predetermined conditions are met — are increasingly used in Nigerian fintech for lending, payments, and asset transfers. They are also a rich source of unresolved litigation risk. Nigerian law has not addressed smart contracts directly. The fundamental legal questions: does a smart contract constitute a binding legal contract under Nigerian law, satisfying offer, acceptance, consideration, and intention to create legal relations; if a smart contract executes incorrectly due to a code error (a “bug”), is the outcome binding, or does equity provide a remedy; where a smart contract involves parties in multiple jurisdictions, which law governs and which courts have jurisdiction; and can a blockchain transaction be reversed or rescinded — and if not, how does Nigerian law address unjust enrichment in an immutable ledger environment.

The immutability problem: the defining feature of blockchain transactions — immutability — is also their greatest legal risk. When a Nigerian bank mistakenly transfers funds by paper instruction, reversal mechanisms exist. When a smart contract automatically executes a transfer of crypto-assets due to a bug or manipulation, there may be no technical mechanism for reversal. Nigerian courts will face the question of whether they can — and should — order remedies against an immutable record.

Regulatory overlay: the CBN’s posture on cryptocurrency and blockchain has oscillated between outright prohibition (the 2021 circular) and cautious engagement (the 2023 Guidelines on Crypto-Asset Service Providers). In-house counsel must track this regulatory position carefully. Regulatory illegality: a contract to perform an activity prohibited by the CBN may be void for illegality under Nigerian law — if your fintech platform facilitated transactions during the period of the 2021 prohibition, those transactions may be unenforceable, creating both creditor risk and fraud exposure. CASP licensing: the 2023 Guidelines require Crypto-Asset Service Providers to obtain CBN licences; contracts entered into by unlicensed CASPs may be treated as unenforceable, exposing platforms to claims by users who suffered losses.

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Risk area 04 — Data privacy violations as litigation triggers

The Nigeria Data Protection Act 2023 (NDPA) and its predecessor, the NDPR 2019, have quietly created the most significant new litigation risk for Nigerian fintech companies. Data-driven business models — credit scoring, behavioural targeting, data monetisation — are directly in the crosshairs.

The pathway from data violation to civil litigation has three primary forms: an individual claim (unlawful processing, breach, or disclosure of personal data — via the tort of breach of statutory duty and the NDPA Section 48 private right of action); regulatory enforcement (an NDPC investigation following complaint or audit — administrative fines plus reputational damage triggering board/shareholder claims); and contractual liability (a B2B data processing agreement breach — contract damages and indemnity claims under data processing agreements).

High-risk practices in Nigerian fintech: contact harvesting (several Nigerian lending platforms have faced NDPC complaints for accessing borrowers’ full contact lists to harass defaulters — this exposes platforms to NDPA violations and tortious liability to the harassed third parties, not just the borrower); data sharing without consent (credit bureaux integrations, third-party marketing partnerships, and investor due diligence data rooms have all generated disputes where data was shared without the data subject’s knowledge or valid consent); and inadequate breach notification (the NDPA requires notification of personal data breaches within 72 hours to the NDPC — failure to comply compounds regulatory exposure and, in litigation, signals a pattern of non-compliance that undermines the platform’s credibility).

Key drafting requirement: every fintech contract that involves the processing of personal data — which is virtually all of them — must include a Data Processing Agreement (DPA) that complies with the NDPA 2023. A DPA that merely incorporates the NDPA by reference, without specifying lawful basis, retention periods, and breach response obligations, will not protect the platform in litigation.

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Risk area 05 — Dispute resolution architecture in digital contracts

The question of how fintech disputes are resolved is as important as the substantive law that governs them. Most Nigerian fintech T&Cs contain dispute resolution provisions — but many are drafted for a different era of commerce and will not function as intended when challenged.

The jurisdiction conundrum: a Nigerian fintech platform headquartered in Lagos, using cloud infrastructure in Ireland, serving customers in Abuja, and holding funds in a UK correspondent account may face jurisdictional challenges in every court to which it turns. In-house counsel must think jurisdictionally from the product design stage and not after the dispute arises. What works: Federal High Court litigation (appropriate for regulatory and IP disputes, but slow for commercial disputes and the public record is a reputational risk); institutional arbitration through the LCA/ICC (preferred for high-value B2B disputes; confidentiality is a key advantage; cost is proportionate above ₦50M); CBN/FCCPC complaint mechanisms (the mandatory first step for consumer disputes — engage regulators before courts); online dispute resolution (emerging, with no dedicated Nigerian framework yet; useful for low-value consumer disputes but unproven at scale); and class actions (a growing risk for platforms with large consumer bases — a single data breach can generate a representative suit).

The consumer redress obligation: the FCCPC’s Digital Lending Guidelines 2022 impose mandatory internal dispute resolution mechanisms on digital lenders. Failure to maintain and operate these mechanisms is itself a regulatory violation — and a litigation risk when a consumer can demonstrate the internal mechanism was absent or illusory.

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The in-house counsel fintech litigation audit and editor’s note

Use this checklist to assess your platform’s current exposure. E-signature and authentication: the platform preserves timestamped audit logs of all user consent events (IP, device ID, session token, timestamp); OTP or biometric consent is backed by a written legal opinion on its enforceability for your transaction type; Section 84 Evidence Act certificates are prepared and held for all computer-generated records in active disputes. Click-wrap and terms of service: all material terms (arbitration clause, liability cap, data-sharing consent) appear above the fold and before the consent click; browse-wrap agreements have been identified and converted to click-wrap; T&Cs have been reviewed for FCCPC Digital Lending Guidelines compliance within the last 12 months. Blockchain and smart contracts: smart contracts are accompanied by a traditional written agreement that governs in the event of code error or dispute; CASP licensing status has been confirmed and contracts entered during unlicensed periods reviewed for enforceability risk; a reversal/remediation protocol exists for erroneous smart contract executions. Data privacy and NDPA 2023: every contract involving personal data processing includes an NDPA-compliant Data Processing Agreement; a 72-hour breach notification protocol is documented, tested, and assigned to a named officer; contact harvesting and third-party data sharing practices have been reviewed against NDPA lawful basis requirements. Dispute resolution: consumer-facing T&Cs include a CBN/FCCPC-compliant internal dispute resolution mechanism; B2B agreements specify seat, governing law, rules, and appointing authority for arbitration; jurisdiction strategy has been reviewed for cross-border products involving foreign cloud, payments rails, or counterparties.

Digital speed, analogue courts: the central challenge for Nigerian in-house counsel in fintech is a mismatch of tempo. Fintech products are built and deployed in weeks. Nigerian litigation takes years. By the time a court rules on whether an OTP constitutes a valid signature, the platform will have processed millions of similar transactions under the same uncertain framework. The practical answer is not to wait for legislative clarity. It is to build contracts, consent mechanisms, and dispute resolution architecture that are defensible now — under existing Nigerian law, with existing Nigerian courts. The platforms that invest in this work today will be the ones that litigate less tomorrow.

This article is provided for general information only and does not constitute legal advice. It is not a substitute for specific advice on any particular matter.Kempes & Kaplan LP accepts no responsibility for any loss arising from reliance on this material.

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