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Consequence of inexcusable delay or cancellation
The implication is that an airline cannot escape liability for delays or cancellations resulting from its own negligence, such as where it negligently fails to notify passengers of cancellations within a reasonable time frame. Any delay to a passenger’s flight, or to the delivery of cargo or baggage, occasioned by an airline’s negligence may automatically result in an award of damages against the airline, except where there is contributory negligence by the passenger.
The attitude of the court in such cases is to award damages where a passenger successfully proves the delay resulted from a negligent act or omission of the airline and its agents, especially where done recklessly or without regard to whether damage would likely result. In Mekwunye v Emirates Airlines (2019) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1677) 191, the Supreme Court held that the airline was in flagrant breach of contract where it cancelled the appellant’s confirmed ticket without prior notice and denied her boarding despite her having confirmed the flight on three separate occasions — the Court held this to be a breach of a fundamental term of the contract of carriage, entitling her to damages beyond a mere refund.
Also, in Tolulope Aderemi v Kenya Airways (Suit No. FHC/L/CS/2092/2019), the Federal High Court, Ikoyi (Faji J) awarded damages in favour of the plaintiff for the loss he suffered as a result of the defendant’s summary cancellation and wanton delay of his flight, and its failure to notify him or his agent of the delay or to give a cogent reason for it.
To borrow a leaf from international jurisprudence, courts in the United Kingdom have made notable pronouncements on the consequence of inexcusable delay. In Lipton and another v BA Cityflyer Ltd [2024] UKSC 24, the appellant airline relied on the defence of “extraordinary circumstances which could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures had been taken” to resist a claim for flight delay compensation. The facts were that in January 2018, Mr and Mrs Lipton’s flight to London was cancelled after their pilot unexpectedly and suddenly fell ill at short notice while at home and off duty. They were placed on another flight, which arrived two hours and thirty-six minutes after their original scheduled arrival time, and claimed compensation under EC Regulation 261/2004. The air carrier succeeded at first instance and on the first appeal on its reliance on the defence of “extraordinary circumstances.” It lost, however, at the Court of Appeal, and the airline’s further appeal to the UK Supreme Court fared no better: a five-Justice panel unanimously held that a pilot’s sudden illness was not an “extraordinary circumstance” within the meaning of the Regulation. As Lord Sales and Lady Rose held: staff absence is not one of the factors identified in recital 14 as indicative of “exceptional circumstances”; the only factor listed there that is potentially referable to staff absence is strike action, which is much more likely to be out of the ordinary than a sick member of staff.